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 Climate change is a moral problem. The main reason to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions is a concern for faraway lands (Schelling 2000), 
distant futures (Nordhaus 1982), and remote probabilities (Weitzman 
2009). The people who emit most are least affected by climate change, and 
the benefits of their abatement would be diffused. Carbon dioxide dwells in 
the atmosphere for decades and the effects on temperature and sea level 
play out over even longer periods. On central projections  climate change 
and its impacts are a nuisance for rich countries and a problem for poor 
countries. But there is a chance that things will go horribly wrong. If you 
do not care about risk, the future, or other people, then you have little 
reason to care about climate change. 
 
In a recent paper (Anthoff and Tol 2010), we propose a novel way to 
evaluate the impact of climate change on other people. In the early days of 
cost-benefit analyses of climate policy, researchers estimated the impacts of 
climate change on different countries, monetised them based on local 
values, and added up the dollar terms to arrive at an estimate of the world 
total damage (Pearce et al. 1996). In turn, this was used to estimate the 
social cost of carbon – the level at which greenhouse gas emissions should 
be taxed. 
 
This method is simple but ignores the fact that  a dollar is worth more 
to a poor woman than to a rich one. Another objection is that a risk to life 
in a poor country is valued differently than a risk to life in a rich country. 
Therefore, analysts proposed to use equity weights (Fankhauser et al. 1997). 
Essentially, impacts are valued locally but national estimates are weighted 
when aggregating to the global total, with the weights correcting for 
income differences. 
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However, this method is inappropriate for national decisions. Equity 
weights presume a global welfare function. In other words, a global, 
benevolent planner would use equity weights. That does not mean, 
however, that a national government should do the same. Particularly, 
equity weights are less than one for rich countries. If the government of a 
rich country uses equity weights to estimate the carbon price, then it 
discounts the impacts on its own electorate while emphasizing the impacts 
in other jurisdictions (Anthoff et al. 2009). 
 
We propose four alternative ways in which a national government might 
value impacts in other regions of the world when computing a social cost 
of carbon that could be used in domestic cost benefit analysis. Each 
method considers the domestic impacts as valued in the home country, but 
the methods use different principles to consider impacts abroad: 
 
1. Sovereignty: Ignore impacts abroad. 
2. Altruism: Empathise with people abroad. 
3. Good neighbour: Feel guilty if damage is done to people 
abroad. 
4. Liability: Compensate if damage is done to people abroad. 
The first principle stands out. The differences between the other three 
principles are  more subtle. An altruist cares about others in general, while a 
good neighbour cares about what she does to others. An altruist may be 
tempted to try and solve all the worlds problems through climate policy 
(although with the right separability conditions this point is moot at the 
margin). A good neighbour would consider the impacts as they are 
perceived by the victims and therefore use the victims’ discount rates. If 
you are liable for future damage, you use your own discount rate. 
 
We use FUND, an integrated assessment model, to estimate the social 
cost of carbon, the additional damage done if one extra tonne of carbon 
dioxide is emitted today. Figure 1 shows the results, assuming a pure rate of 
time preference of 1% per year and an inequality aversion of 1. The sum of 
the regional social costs (“cooperation”) is $16/tC (in $1995), well within 
the range of estimates in previous studies (Tol 2009). Split over 16 regions 
(“sovereignty”) the social costs are obviously much lower. China stands out 
as very vulnerable. This is due to a range of factors, including its large size, 
aging population, precarious water supply, and economic concentration in 
the coastal zone. For regions with slow (fast) growth, the compensated 
social costs are higher (lower) than the cooperative costs. The equity-
weighted social costs are $28/tC, almost double the simple sum as more 
weight is placed on the higher impacts in the poorer regions. Good-
neighbour social costs are much higher than equity-weighted damages for 
rich regions, and lower for poor regions. Altruistic social costs are 
somewhere in between the sovereign costs and the good-neighbour costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The Regional Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide (in $/tC)  
 
 
USA=United States of America; CAN=Canada; WEU=Western Europe; 
JPK=Japan and South Korea; ANZ=Australia and New Zealand; 
EEU=Eastern Europe; FSU=Former Soviet Union; MDE=Middle 
East;CAM=Central America; SAM=South America; SAS=South Asia; 
SEA=Southeast Asia; CHI=China; NAF=North Africa; SSA=Sub-Saharan 
Africa; SIS=Small Island States; Source: (Anthoff and Tol 2010). 
 
The policy implications are twofold. First, a wide range of carbon taxes 
can be defended. The highest carbon tax differs from the lowest carbon tax 
by up to a factor of 70. This large difference is solely due to different 
ethical positions on the kind of responsibility one country should have 
towards other countries. That is a political decision. 
 
Second, without cooperation, different regions will have different 
carbon taxes. However, a lack of international cooperation on target-setting 
does not necessarily lead to low carbon taxes. If countries agree to 
compensate one another for the damage they do to one another, carbon 
taxes would be substantial. That obligation already exists in principle, but 
practice is different. A treaty making countries liable for the damage they 
cause would most likely reduce emissions further than an international 
treaty on emission reduction. 
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